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CENTER;
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiff/Appellant Thomas R.Taylor ("Taylor") sued
Defendant/Respondent Dr. David Chamberlain, D.O. (" Dr. Chamberlain"), Defendant/Respondent
Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. d/b/a Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC") and
Defendant/Respondent Dr. John M. Jacobs ("Dr. Jacobs") for their negligent treatment of him.
Dr. Chamberlain, while performing laparoscopic lap band surgery on Taylor at EIRMC's
hospital, negligently punctured Taylor's transverse colon and negligently failed to catch the injury
prior to completing the surgery. Dr. Chamberlain's actions caused stool to leak from Taylor'S
transverse colon, causinga life-threatening infection. EIRMC negligently failed to maintain internal
procedures that would have allowed Taylor's injuries and infection to be caught, resulting in
Taylor's infection going unnoticed and untreated. Additionally, radiologist Dr. Jacobs, I negligently
failed to spot Taylor's internal injuries on a CT scan, further delaying treatment of Taylor's injuries
and infection. Taylor underwent months of grueling recovery, including seven more surgeries, but
he will nonetheless never be the same.

B.

Course of the Proceedings Below.

Taylor commenced this action on January 20, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 31. In his Complaint,
Taylor alleged that on January 27,2009, Dr. Chamberlain performed laparoscopic lap band surgery

EIRMC, Dr. Chamberlain, and Dr. Jacobs are collectively referred to herein as "Respondents."
Taylor does not appeal the dismissal without prejudice of claims against any other named defendant.
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on Taylor, at a hospital owned and operated by ElRMC. R. Vol. l, p. 10. Taylor alleged that Dr.
Chamberlain negligently punctured Taylor's transverse colon and negligently failed to catch the
injury prior to completing the surgery. R. Vol. I, pp.

10~11.

As a result of these serious internal

injuries, stool leaked from Taylor's transverse colon, causing a life-threatening infection. R. Vol.
l, p. 12. Taylor alleged that EIRMC failed to maintain internal procedures that would have allowed
his injuries and infection to be caught; instead, Taylor's infection raged unnoticed and untreated.
R. Vol. 1., pp.12. Additionally, Taylor alleged that Dr. Jacobs, a radiologist, negligently failed to

spot the internal injury on a CT scan, further delaying treatment of Taylor's injuries and infection.
R. Vol. l, p. 12. Taylor underwent months of grueling recovery, including seven more surgeries, but
he will nonetheless never be the same. R. Vol. I, pp.

12~13.

On August 16,2011, EIRMC filed a motion to dismiss Taylor's claims against it. R. Vol.
l, p. 21. In its motion, EIRMC argued that Taylor had failed to timely serve EIRMC pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a)(2), and that Taylor's failure was not justified by good cause. R.
Vol. I, p. 31. On August 24,2011, Dr. Chamberlain filed a motion to dismiss Taylor'S claims agaillst
it. R. Vol. I, p. 49. In its motion, Dr. Chamberlain argued not only that Taylor had failed to timely
serve Dr. Chamberlain pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2) and that Taylor's failure was not justified by good
cause, but that Taylor's prior attempt to serve Dr. Chamberlain was invalid. R. Vol. I, p. 49. Neither
EIRMC nor Dr. Chamberlain argued that they had suffered any prejudice as a result of Taylor's
delay in serving them. On August 24, 2011, Dr. Jacobs answered without contesting the timing of
service of process upon him. R. Vol. I, p. 66.
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Taylor opposed both motions. R. Vol. I, p. 39, 105. In connection wIth Taylor's oppositions.
Taylor contemporancously filed a Cross-Motion to Stay Case NUllc Pro Tunc or, Altcrnativcly. tu
Enlarge time to Serve Defendants. R. Vol. I, p. 36. In that motion, Taylor moved the District COUl1
to retroactively enter a stay of the case for a time period equivalent to the time that Taylor's claims
were before the Idaho Board of Medicine's pre litigation screening panel.

R. Vol. I, p. 36.

Alternatively, Taylor requested an extension of time , pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b),
to serve the named defendants. R. Vol. 1, p. 36.
In an Opinion and Order entered on September 29,2011, the District Court denied Taylor's
motion and dismissed his claims against EIRMC and Dr. Chamberlain without prejudice. R. Vol.
I, p. 140. Relying on Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003), the District Court
concluded that the case was not automatically stayed pending resolution of pre litigation proceedings.
R. Vol. I, pp. 137-38. The District Court implicitly (without discussion) rejected Taylor's request
for a stay nunc pro tunc. Regarding Taylor's Rule 6(b) motion, as well as his argument that good
cause pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2) existed, the District Court stated as follows:
Although the Court is not persuaded that the actions of Plaintiff meet the less
stringent excusable neglect standard of Rule 6(b), that matter does Ilot have
to be decided by this Court. A specific statute, and by analogy a specific
rule of civil or criminal procedure, controls over a more general statute when
there is any conflict between the two or when the general statute is vague or
ambiguous. Rule 4(a)(2) is a specific rule that is to be applied strictly.
Although Rule 6(b) and Rule 1 open the door to grant relief for negligence
to comply if deemed excusable, fostering Rule I (a)'s favoring of liberality
and cases being decided on the merits, the more specific and stringent
restriction of Rule 4(a)(2) must override. This Court cannot allow the

ApPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON ApPEAL - PAGE
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Plaintiff to shift the good cause inquiry of Rule 4(a)(2) into a less stringent
excusable neglect inquiry simply by filing a motion to stay nunc pro tunc
after the six-month requirement has passed and EIRMC has filed a motion
to dismiss. Therefore, the good cause inquiry under rule 4(a)(2) is the
standard that must be met in this case and the COLlrt finds that the actions of
Plaintiff do not meet that standard.

R. Vol. I, pp. 139-40 (citations omitted)(italics in original). On October 3,2011, the District Court
entered a judgment dismissing Taylor's claims against EIRMC and Dr. Chamberlain without
preJudIce. R. Vol. 1, p. 144.
Taylor filed a notice of appeal on November 14,2011. R. Vol. I, p. 146. On December 19.
2011, the District Court amended its judgment to dismiss all defendants, including Dr. Jacobs,
without prejudice. R. Vol. I, p. 151. On January 30, 2012, Taylor filed an amended notice of appeal
of the District Court's amended judgment. R. Vol. I, p. 155.

C.

Statement of Facts.

On January 20,2011, Taylor commenced this action against Dr. Chamberlain, EIRMC
and Dr. Jacobs. R. Vol. I, p. 7. On January 24, 2011, Taylor commenced prelitigation
proceedings before the Idaho Board of Medicine by filing Notice of Claim. R. Vol. I, p. 31. The
prelitigation panel issued its recommendations on April 19,2011. R. Vol. I, pp. 31-32. Taylor
served EIRMC on August 8, 2011. R. Vol. I, pp. 20, 32. On August 5,2011, Taylor attempted
service on Dr. Chamberlain. R. Vol. I, p. 62. Following Dr. Chamberlain's objection to proper
service, on September 5, 2011, Taylor personally served Dr. Chamberlain. R. Vol. I, pp. 117.
119. Dr. Jacobs, having been previously duly served, filed an answer to Taylor's complaint

ApPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF' ON ApPEAL - PAGE
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August 24, 2011, and did not contest the timeliness of service of process. R. Vol. I, p. 66.
Six months (or approximately180 days) from January 20, 2011, was Tuesday, July 19,2011. Six
months (or approximately 180 days) from April 19,2011, was Thursday, October 6,2011.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court err by applying the good cause standard of Idaho Rule ofCivi I

Procedure 4(a)(2) rather than the excusable neglect standard ofIdaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b),
and by dismissing Taylor's case on that basis?
2.

Does Taylor's failure to serve Respondents within six months of the filing of his

complaint constitute excusable neglect?
3.

Did the District Court err by refusing to sta y the case nunc pro tunc pursuant to Idaho

Code § 6-1006?
4.

Is Taylor entitled to attomey's fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 ?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions oflaw - which includes the issue of identifying governing law
- without any deference to the district court's rUling. See, Quick

I'.

Crane. 111 Idaho 754, 764. 7!.7

P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). Whether to enlarge a deadline post-expiration is a matter of discretion.
which this Court reviews for abuse of discretion. See, Wheeler v. McIntyre, 100 Idaho 286, 2159, 5%
P.2d 798,801 (1979) (describing the Rule 6(b) analysis as one of discretion). Although few Idaho
appellate decisions review determinations pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), numerous

ApPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON ApPEAL - PAGE
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appellate decisions review determinations pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)( 1), which
sets forth an "excusable neglect" standard for setting aside judgmeills.

Excusable neglect

determinations under that rule are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho
571,576,212 P.3d 1001, 1006 (2009). That is consistent with the plain language of Rule 6(b).
which also invokes the district court's discretion. See, Idaho R. Civ. P. 6(b).

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Erred by Failing to Apply Rule 6(b)'s Excusable Neglect
Standard, and by Dismissing Plaintiff's Case Pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2) and Rudd.

1.

The Policy of the Rules of Civil Procedure Favors a Resolution on the Merits and the
Application of Rule 6(b)'s Excusable Neglect Standard.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure lea) explicitly instructs courts that the Rules "shall be

liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding." See, I.R.C.P. 1(a) (emphasis added). The rule is written in mandatory language
without exception. ld. "Even in this day of burgeoning case loads, [the Idaho Supreme CourtJ has
not compromised Idaho's commitment to decide cases on their merits." Sec, Golay

l'.

Loomis, 118

Idaho 387, 396,797 P.2d 95, 104 (1990).
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of this "liberal construction" mandate,
including in ways that bear on Taylor's case. In Sines v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 566 P.2d 758 (1977),
the Court identified a "general policy of providing [parties ] [their] day in court." ld., 98 Idaho at
437,566 P.2d at 760. It also characterized Rule 1(a) as "a constant reminder that the rules me to be
liberally construed, and ajust result is always the ultimate goal to be accomplished." lei., 98 Idaho
at 439.566 P.2d at 762.
ApPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON ApPEAL - PAGE
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Later, in Holmes v. Henderson Oil Co., lO2 Idaho 214,628 P.2d 1048 (1981), this Court
reversed an order dismissing a motion to substitute a party. In so ruling, the Court harmonized three
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 17(a), 19(a)( 1), and 2 j

~

under Rule j's umbrella to require

granting a motion to substitute a party under the circumstances present In that case. See lei., I U2
Idaho at 216, 628 P.2d at 1050. The "liberal construction" mandate is therefore not limited to
discrete rules, but serves to harmonize the collective interpretation of rules. Importantly. in BUlin
v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 587 P.2d 1245 (1978), this Court reviewed a district court's dismissal of an
untimely appeal from a magistrate judge's decision. This C01ll1 said:
The object of statutes and rules regulating procedure in the courts is to
promote the administration ofjustice. Those statutes and rules which fix the
time within which procedural rights are to be asserted are intended to
expedite the disposition of causes to the end that justice will not be denied by
inexcusable and unnecessary delay. But, except as to those which are
mandatory or jurisdictional,procedural regulations should nol be so applied
as to defeat their primary purpose, thaI is, the disposition oj causes upon
Iheir suhslonllalmeril) \I'ilholll dd(ll iii' pre/lldicc

Bunn, supra, 99 Idaho at 711, 587 P.2d at 1246 (emphasis added) (quoting Stoner v. Turner. 73
Idaho 117,121,247 P.2d 469, 471 (1952)). This Court further noted:
The "liberal construction" of the niles required by Rule 1. while it cannot
alter compliance which is mandatOlY and jurisdictional, will ordinarily
preclude dismissal of an appeal for that which is but technical
noncompliance. This will be especially so where no prejudice is shown by
any delay which may have been occasioned . ... Judicial discretion, the
exercise of which may result in an appeal's dismissal, must be a sound
judicial discretion. Soundjudicial discretion properly exercised will reflecl
the judicial policy of this State developed over many years by case law, and
lying within the spirit of liberality mandated by Rule 1.

ApPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF' ON ApPEAL - PAGE

7

ld., 99 Idaho at 712,587 P.2d at 1247 (first and third emphases added). In ruling upon the specific

dismissal at issue, this Court characterized the former Rule 83(s) as "not requir[ing] dismissal," but
simply making "dismissal ... but a sanction, albeit the ultimate one." Jd. This Court therefore
reversed the district court's dismissal of the appeal.
These cases - particularly Holmes and Bunn - identify the approach the district court should
have taken. As Holmes teaches, when presented with a facial conflict between Rule 4(a)(2) and
Rule 6(b) (assuming such a conflict exists), the District Court should have read them together to
foster a resolution on the Illcrits. not dismissal. .\ncl Rulc 4(a)(2) i" plTcN'ly the type ofruic

th~l!

the Bunn Court identified as being particularly subject to a "liberal construction." Rule 4(21)(2)':;
service deadline is not jurisdictional. The authors of the Rules know how to identify jurisdictional
requirements when they wish, and they have not done so with Rule 4(a)(2). Compare I.R.C.P.
4(a)(2) with I.R.C.P. 83(s) ("The failure to physically file a notice of appeal. .. shall be jurisdictional
.... "). And, Rule 4(a)(2) makes neither service within six months nor subsequent dismissal.
mandatory - a plaintiff can always either show "good cause" for a failure, or, pursuant to Rule 6(b),
show "cause" for an extension of the deadline or "excusable neglect" for failing to do so. See
I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2), 6(b). "Cause" and "excusable neglect," at least, are discretionary determinations.
See, I.R.C.P. 6(b). In any event, the

BUlliI COLlrt

excl1lpteel only rules that are "mandatory emel

jurisdictional." See Bunn, supra, 99 Idaho at 712, 587 P.2d at 124 7 (emphasis added)."

2Although it also used the phrase "mandatory or jurisdictional" (emphasis added), plainly
what the Bunn Court was trying to identify were not simply those decisions to which the word
"shall" is attached, but that strike at the very heart of whether a district court can hear the case.
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Rule 1(a) obligated the District Court to harmonize Rule 4(a)(2) and Rule 6(b) - neither of
which is mandatory nor jurisdictional- in a way that promotes justice, fairness, and resolution on
the merits. Rule 6(b)'s excusable neglect standard is a "more relaxed standard" than Rule 4(a)(2)'s
good cause standard. See, Sammis v. MagneTek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 347. 941 P.2d 319 (1997).
To the extent Rule 4(a)(2) and Rule 6(b) conflict in the circumstances presented here, Rule I (n)
required the District Court to resolve that conflict in favor of applying Rule 6(b)'s excusable neglect
standard.
2.

The Purpose of Idaho's Prelitigation Procedure Further Favored an Application of
Rule 6(b),s Excusable Neglect Standard.

The stated legislative intent ofIdaho's medical malpractice prelitigation procedure recognizes
that it is "in the public interest to encourage nonlitigation resolution of claims against physicians and
hospitals by providing for prelitigation screening of such claims by a hearing panel as provided in
this act." See. Idaho Code ~ 6-1001 (legislative intent): see a/so, S.L. 1976, ch. 27R.

~

I, This Court

has already held that a party may file a complaint and then commence prel itigation proceedings.

See, Moss v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho 165,166,765 P.2d 676,677 (1988). Requiring a party to serve
a lawsuit during the course of prelitigation proceedings violates the purpose and intent of the
prelitigation procedure, as it would force parties to simultaneously litigate and engage in a process
designed to curb litigation. The District COL1l1 should henT construed and reconciled Rule -+(d)(2)
and Rule 6(b) to permit District Court litigation to defer to ongoing prelitigation proceedings, rather

If the court can hear the case. its job is to produce. whenever possible. a decision on the merits.
ApPELLA"T'S OI'E'\'I'\'(; BRIEF 0" Apl'F\l

P·\CF l)

than to create an environment where Taylor was effectively forced to do both simultaneously.'

3.

To the Extent a Conflict Exists Between Rule 4(a)(2) and Rule 6(b l, Rule 6(b) Is the
More Specific Rule and Should Have Governed the Court's Decision.

!fA specific statute, and by analogy a specific rule of civil or criminal procedure, controls
(wer a more general statute 'vvhen there is any conflict between the

1\\'0

or when the general statute

is vague or ambiguous. Ausman v. State (in re Ausman), 125 Idaho g39, g42, 1:;64 P.2d 1126, 112Y
II

(1993). Rule 4(a)(2) and Rule 6(b) are the provisions at issue. The former provides as follows:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant
within six (6) months after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose
behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service
was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that
defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative within 14 days
notice to such party or upon motion.
LR.C.P.4(a)(2). In tum, Rule 6(b) provides as follows:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an
act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the parties,
by written stipulation, which does not disturb the orderly dispatch of business
or the convenience of the court, filed in the action, before or after the
expiration of the specified period, may enlarge the period, or the court for
cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or
notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the
expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by previous
order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period
pel111it the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect; but the time may not be extended for taking any action under rules
50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d), (e), and 60(b) except to the extent and under the
conditions stated in them.

3Notably, before the District Court, the vast majority (with Rudd as the single exception)
of the cases Respondents cited were not medical malpractice cases. That is a critical distinction,
as those cases were decided of a procedural context that the Idaho Legislature created to foster
nonjudicial resolution. They therefore have limited bearing on this appeal.
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I.R.C.P.6(b). Rule 4(a)(2) says that if a party fails to serve another party within six months after
filing the complaint, that party must demonstrate good cause for its failure or face dismissal without
prejudice. See, l.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). By contrast, Rule 6(b) says that a party may ask for more time to
serve a party with a summons and complaint either before or after the passage of the deadline. If
the request is made before the expiration of the deadline, it is governed by the "cause" standard.

Explicitly, the request may be made after the expiration of the deadline, and if it is, it is governed
by the "excusable neglect" standard.
As the District Court described it. the tension between these t'vvo provisions is that under the
circumstances present in this case, Rule 6(b) renders Rule 4(a)(2) nonexistent. But that tension is
illusory. Rule 4(a)(2) simply provides for dismissal without prejudice if a plaintiff does not serve
process upon a defendant within six months of filing. Rule 6(b) sets forth a standard govern ing
requests to, among other things, enlarge a plaintiffs time for serving process upon a defendant. 4
To the extent any tension exists, Rule 6(b) is the more specific rule and governs over Rule
4(a)(2). On its face, Rule 6(b) specifies a number of rules that it does not trump-specifically, Rule

4The District Court's recitation of the potential conflict contains an inadvertent, but
subtle, misstatement. The District Court said that Taylor sought to "shift the good cause inquiry
of Rule 4(a)(2) into a less stringent excusable neglect inquiry simply by 1iling a motion to stay
nunc pro tunc after the six-month requirement has passed and ETRMC has filed a motion to
dismiss." R. Vol. I, p. 140. The motion to stay nunc pro tunc is not what would invoke an
excusable neglect inquiry. Rather, Taylor's Rule 6(b) motion---based on Rule 6(b), which
expressly contemplates motions to extend time to serve filed after the expiration of the service
deadline-is what invokes that standard. See, LR.C.P. 6(b).
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50(b); Rule 52(b); Rule 59(b), Cd), and (e); and Rule 60(b). Rule 4(a) is not included in that list.
Plainly, the drafters of Rule 6(b) intended its standards to trump Rule 4(a)(2); otherwise, they would
have lumped Rule 4(a) with the list of rules that trump Rule 6(b). Even leaving that aside. Rule 6(b)
governs requests for extension, a subject that Rule 4(a){2) docs not even address, and which is the
real subject of this appeal. Pursuant to Rule 6(b), Rule 4(a)(2)'s six-month service deadlille may
become, say, a seven-month deadline, or even a twelve-month deadline, regardless of whether the
request is made before or after expiration of the deadline, so long as the applicable standards are
met. 5 Rule 6(b) informs, and has the ability to modify, Rule 4(a)(2)'s time limitations. Critically,
because Rule 6(b) can modify Rule 4(a)(2), but not vice versa, Rule 6(b) is the more specific rule.
Furthermore, the District Court's - and Respondents' - reading of Rule 6(b) would render
it nonexistent. By its plain language, Rule 6(b) authorizes requests made after the expiration of the

applicable deadline, and it provides that such requests are governed by the excusable neglect
standard. See, 1.R.C.P.6(b). The import of Respondents , argument in the District Court, and the
District Court's conclusion, is that a plaintiff simply does not get to make that ki nd of request, even
though Rule 6(b) not only says that it can, but does not include Rule 4(a)(2) in the list of rules that
trump Rule 6(b). The concern of the District Court, and Respondents, that a plaintiff can circumvent
Rule 4(a)(2) simply by filing a post-deadline request to extend the service deadline is illusory. A
plaintiff should be able to do so, but that does not launch any parade of horribles. The plain
language of Rule 6(b) demonstrates that that is how it should work.

5Ifthe request is made before expiration, the standard is mere "cause," and the request
can even be made without notice. See, I.R.C.P. 6(b).
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Moreover, Rule 4(a)(1) is nothing more than a nonmandatory, nonjurisdictional, procedural
rule. So long as procedure rather than substance is at issue, and given that Rule lea) articulates a
strong policy of substantive resolution, the fact that a plaintiff employs a particular procedural ru Ie
to overcome the import of Rule 4(a)(2) should cause little concern. This ent ire appeal concerns onl)
ministerial procedural issues surrounding a nineteen-day tardiness in serving Respondents. Indeed.
Rule 6(b)'s excusable neglect standard mitigates the undeniable harshness of Rule 4(a)(2). If a
plaintiff - like Taylor - thinks fast enough to use a procedural rule to parry a procedural thrust by
a defendant (particularly where the parry is explicitly justified by the plain language of the rule),
good for the plaintiff()
4.

Rudd and Its Line of Cases Do Not Speak to the Applicability of Rule 6(b) and Arc
Distinguishable.

The District Court based its decision entirely upon the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in
Rudd. But Ruddhas little bearing on this case. There, this Court affirmed a district court's dismissal
of a medical malpractice action on the ground that the plaintiffs did not timely serve the defendants
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that Idaho Code § 6-1006 tolled the running of Rule 4(a)(2)'s
six-month service deadline. The Court rejected that argument on the ground that "[t]here is ...
nothing in Idaho Code § 6-1006 that tolls the running of the period within which the summons and
complaint must be served." Jd., 138 Idaho at 531,66 P.3d at 235. The Rudd Court further found

6The fact that Rule 4(a)(2) is to be applied "strictly" appears to apply only to the facts
courts look at to determine the existence of "good cause." See, Rudd, supra, 138 Idaho at 533,
66 P.3d at 237. It does not mean that Rule 4(a)(2) is applied even where other rules explicitly
trump it, nor is it an exception to Rule 1(a)'s stated policy of fostering decisions on the merits.
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that good cause pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2) did not exist. Jd., 138 Idaho at 533, 66 P.3d at 23 7. It was
on that basis that the Rudd Court affirmed dismissal. Rudd did not address the applicability of Rule
6(b). Similarly, this Court in Elliott v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 271 P.3d 678 (2012), undertook the
same analysis as the Rudd Court did, and it did not address the applicabil ity of Rule 6(b).
5.

The District Court Erred by Refusing to Apply Rule G(b)

The District Court committed legal error by applying Rule 6(b)'s good cause standard, rather
than Rule 6(b )'s excusable neglect standard, to EIRMC's and Dr. Chamberlain's motions to dismiss,
and to Taylor'S motion for extension. This Court owes that legal ruling no deference. and it should
reverse on that basis.

B.

Taylor's Delay in Serving Respondents Was the Product of Excusable Neglect.

The District Court did not rule on whether Taylor's delay in serving the complaint and
summons was the product of excusable neglect. 7 As explained above, that should have been the
focus of its analysis. At a minimum, this Court should remand this case to the District Court for

d

determination of excusable neglect consistent with the standards set forth herein. Preferably, thIS
Court will simply reverse the District Court's dismissal on the ground that the record fully Justifies
a determination of excusable neglect.
While ldaho appellate courts rarely construe Rule 6(b), particularly its excusable neglect
standard, they regularly construe Rule 60(b) and its excusable neglect standard. Generally, "ltJhe

7This puts this case in a different posture than if the District Court had declined to
conclude that Taylor's neglect was excusable. The District Court made no such determination in
the first instance.
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conduct constituting excusable neglect must be that which would be expected of a reasonably
prudent person under the same circumstances." See, Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709,117 P.3d 120,
123 (2005). The following sections address factors that Idaho courts consider in making that
determination and demonstrate that those facts demonstrate that any conclusion other than one of
excusable neglect would be an abuse of discretion. In balancing these factors, this Court - or the
District Court in the first instance - must bear in mind that:
What constitutes excusable neglect, or just how a reasonable [sic] prudent
person should act under similar circumstances are comparative terms ....
Each case must be examined in light of the facts presented, and the
circumstances surrounding the same .... in doubtful cases, the general rule
is to incline toward granting relief from the default and bring about a
judgment on the merits.
See, Orange Transp. Co. v. Taylor, 71 Idaho 275, 280-81,230 P.2d 689,692-93 (1951).
1.

Respondents Suffered No Prejudice From Taylor's Short Delay, but Taylor Will
Suffer Devastating Prejudice From a Dismissal.

Among the various applicable factors, the first, and perhaps predominant, factor is whether
any prejudice arises from the delay. See, Nelson v. Pumnea, 106 Idaho 48,51,675 P.2d 27. 30
(1983) (noting "no demonstration of prejudice" in an excusable neglect analysis); PauleI'

l'

Salmon

River Lumber Co., 74 Idaho 483,491,264 P.2d 466, 471 (1953) (noting "no showing that the rights

of respondent were prejudiced by the delay"). As explained above, lack of prejudice to an opposing
party is also a key consideration underlying Rule 1(a). See Bunl1, supra, 99 Idaho at 7 12. 5R7 P.2d
at 1247.
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Here. Taylor filed his complaint on January 20, 2011. Six months from that date was July
19,20 II. Taylor served EJRMC on August 8. 2011. Taylor served Dr. Chamberlain on August).
2011, and then again on September 5, 2011

g

Taylor also served Dr. Jacobs in early Augllst.') In

other words, Taylor served Dr. Chamberlain seventeen days after the deadline, served EIRMC
eighteen days after the deadline, and served Dr. Jacobs at approximately the same time. That short
delay

IS

what gave rise to EIRMC's and Dr. Chamberlain's motions, and this appeal.

Before the District court, none of these Respondents even attempted to argue that they were
prejudiced by Taylor's short delay. Indeed, none of them sustained any prejudice. Dr. Jacobs did
not even bother to object to the timing of service, preferring instead to answer. The appellate record
is devoid of any reliance of any of those Respondents upon the additional eighteen-day wait to be
served.

EIRMC's and Dr. Chamberlain's motions to dIsmiss were the very type of technIcal.

procedure-dependent motions that Rule 1 and Rule 6(b) were designed to prevent. Taylor's short
delay, as well as the utter lack of prejudice that any of the Respondents suffered. makes any neglect
on Taylor's part readily excusable.
Moreover, although it is irrelevant to a good cause analysis pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2) whether
a statute of limitations turns a without-prejudice dismissal into a with-prejudice dismissal,lo there

SThe District Court did not rule on Dr. Chamberlain's challenge to Taylor's August 5,
201 1 attempt to serve him.
9For some reason, the appellate record does not contain a return of service for Dr. Jacobs.
However, Dr. Jacobs answered, having had twenty days to do so. Impliedly, he was served in
early August, 20 I 1.

lOSee, Sammis, supra, 130 Idaho at 347,941 P.2d at 319.
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is no reason why a district court cannot account for such a consideration in a Rule 6(b) excusable
neglect analysis. Rule 6(b) invokes the discretion of the court. See, I.R.C.P. 6(b) (noting that the
court "may at any time in its discretion" order relief pursuant to Rule 6(b)); Wheeler, supra, 100
Idaho at 289, 596 P.2d at 801 (describing the Rule 6(b) analysis as one of discretion). 11 As
explained above, district courts should use their discretion to foster decisions on the merits. Here.
although Taylor indisputably flied his complalllt within the applicable two-year statute 01
limitations, enough time passed that a dismissal without prejudice is. practically speaking, a
dismissal with prejudice. The district court should have applied Rule 6( b), in contrast tl'om Rule
4(a)(2), to obviate that harsh result. The balance of harms - a harmless nineteen-day delay in
serving Respondents, versus dismissal with prejudice of all of Taylor's claims - makes dismissal
inordinately unjust. To the extent the Court reaches this issue, it should reverse dismissal entirely
on this basis alone.
2.

Taylor Was Not Indifferent to His Case, and He Acted Diligently.

Additionally, neglect is excusable if it is not the product of "indifference or unreasonable
delay'" See, Jonsson v. Oxhorrow, 141 Idaho 635. 639 n,2, 115 P.3d 726.

n

I n.2 (2005) (arrlying

a former statute); Stoner,supra, 73 Idaho at 121,247 P.2d at 471 (party claiming excusable neglect
must have acted "promptly and diligently").
The excusable neglect analysis takes into account the reality that Taylor was less than a mere
three weeks late in serving Respondents. Notably. according to Taylor's calculation (leaving aside

IIIn contrast, Rule 4(a)(2)'s good cause analysis is a factual determination. See, Sammis,
supra, 130 Idaho at 346, 941 P.2d at 318.
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its correctness), Taylor had until October 6,2011, to serve Respondents, and he accomplished that
over two months early. Aside from any miscalculation in time Taylor lllilV have cOllllllitted. there
is no evidence that Taylor was anything other than diligent in prosecuting his rights. There is no
evidence in the appellate record that Taylor was indifferent to his case, that his delay was
unreasonable, or that he acted in any way other than promptly and diligently.
3.

To the Extent Taylor's Delay Was Based on a Misapprehension of Law, That Is Still
Excusable Neglect.

In Schraufnagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 747 P.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1987), the Idaho Court
of Appeals noted that the Idaho Supreme Court had previously stated that "a mistake of law is not
an appropriate ground for relief" as excusable neglect. ld., 113 Idaho at 754, 747 P.2d at 776. The
Court of Appeals characterized that as a "general proposition," but then, critically. noted that "[iJn
an appropriate situation a mistake of law might ... be treated as excusable neglect." Id., I 13 Idaho
at 755, 747 P.2d at 777. In so holding, the Court of Appeals noted as follows regarding the overlap
between Rule 60(b)'s "excusable neglect" and "mistake" criteria:
This Court has previously noted that there appears to be no satisfactory
conceptual basis to distinguish entirely a mistake of law frolll excusable
neglect. Indeed, where relief for a mistake has been denied because a
mistake was one of law rather than fact, our Supreme Court has taken care
to point out that the circumstances did not also show excusable neglect. In
line with this reasoning, we have held that in an appropriate situation a
mistake of law might also be treated as excusable neglect.

ld. (citations omitted).12 In Schraufnagel, the Court of Appeals reversed a contrary district court

'2The Idaho Supreme Court cases to which Schraufnagel refers are McKee Bros. Ltd. v.
Mesa Equip., inc., 102 Idaho 202,628 P.2d 1036 (1981 )(affirming dismissal where a defendant
failed to amend an answer and, as an additional step, did not demonstrate excusable neglect); and
Kingsbw}' v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92 P.2d 1053 (l939)(applying excusable neglect as a
separate analysis from a mistake of law analysis).
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decision, concluding that a pro se litigant that misread a court notice could nevertheless claim
excusable neglect. Id. Importantly, the Court of Appeals noted that it "perceivers] a difference
between persons whose indifference leads to entry of a judgment by defau It, and those who take
affirmative steps to plead their own case but fail because they misperceive the intent of a court
document." Id., 113 Idaho at 755, 747 P.2d at 777 (citation omitted). Schraufnagel is still good law.
Prior to Schraufnagel, in Stirm v. Puckett, 107 ldaho 1046, 695 P .2d 431 (Ct. App.

19~5).

the Idaho Court of Appeals stated as follows:
This overlap between mistake and excusable neglect necessarily implies the
existence of cases where an act or omission might be treated as a mistake of
law but also could be treated as excusable neglect. In the federal courts, for
example, a default judgment has been set aside where a defendant failed to
answer upon the erroneous assumption that a co-defendant's answer would
suffice. Defendants have been relieved from default judgments when their
written responses to complaints were sent to the plaintiffs but not to the
courts.
Id .. 107 Idaho at 1059,695 P.2d at 434 (citations omitted). In other words, although Schraujiwgel
dealt with a court notice that was less than clear and perhaps misleading, Srirm recognizes that any
number of circumstances might constitute "neglect" as a mistake of law, but still be excusable.

Stirm, like Schra4nagel, is also still good law.
If there is any case in which a mistake of law may constltute excusable neglect, this

IS It.

Idaho Code § 6-1006, coupled with Moss, strongly suggest that a stay of litigation pending the
resolution of prelitigation proceedings is automatic. See, Idaho Code § 6-1006 (stating that "the
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district courts or other courts having jurisdiction of any pending claim shall stay proceedings"
(emphasis added»); Moss, 115 Idaho at 167,765 P.2d at 678 (holding that

~

6-1006 vests the district

court "with authority to stay civil proceedings until the prelitigation screening panel renders its
advisory opinion"). To say that Moss "suggests" this is perhaps too conservative - there is no
mention anywhere in the Moss decision of a request for a stay, and § 6-1006 uses the word "shall"
when it talks about imposing such a stay. Moreover, the purpose of prel itigation proceedings, as
well as the tolling of the statute of limitations and the stay of proceedings, is to prevent litigation.

See, Idaho Code

~

6-100 I (legislative intent); S.L. 1976, ch. 278,

~

I; Idaho Code

~

6-1005 (toiling

statute oflimitations "in the interest of due consideration being given to such proceedings and in the
interest of encouraging consideration of claims informally and without the necessity of! itigation).
Whether or not the law is, in fact, contrary, the appellate record does not bespeak a plainti tT
that simply ignored a procedural requirement.

At worst, Taylor misinterpreted or misread a

procedural requirement and relied upon virtually every point of law in the analysis except a single
decision that, apparently, answers the question in a contrary way. Taylor is not so different from
the plaintiff in Schraujiwgel, who simply misread a court order.

As with the plaintiff in

Schrm!/iwgel, it is not the case that Taylor indifferently did not seek to expeditiously or even
promptly serve Respondents; at worst, he took affirmative steps, justified by a reading of § 6-1006
and Moss, but failed because he "misperceive[d]" an additional wrinkle in the law. 13

See,

13That the plaintiff in Schrau/iwgel was pro se, but Taylor is represented by counsel, is of
no import to either side. In GolaY', supra, this Court, over a stll1ging dis,',ent, corrected
Schraujiwgel's emphasis on the plaintiffs pro se status, stating that "[p}m se litigants (lrc held
to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." ld., 118 Idaho at 393. 797
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Schraufnagel, 113 Idaho at 755, 747 P.2d at 777. This case exists on the line, recognized by the
Schru4iuzgel Court and the Supreme Court decisions to which it refers, between a "mistake" and
"excusable neglect." Any legal error co III 111 Itted by! ay lor I::' nOl dlSPOSIlI vc ollile excusable neglec l
inquiry and must be weighed in the balance of all remaining factors, including the undisputed lack
of prejudice suffered by Respondents.

C.

The District Court Erred In Refusing to Stay the Case NUllc Pro Tunc.

Alternatively, even if this Court concludes that the District Court properly applIed Rule
4(a)(2), or ifit decides that Taylor does not meet the excusable neglect standard anyway, it should
still reverse on the ground that the District Court erroneously denied Taylor's request for a stay nunc

pro tunc. A brief history of the pertinent statutes and interpretations frames the issues and explains
why reversal is in order. Idaho Code § 6-1005 provides as follows:
There shall be no judicial or other review or appeal of such matters. No party
shal I be obliged to comply with or otherwise [be] affected ur prej udiced bj
the proposals, conclusions or suggestions of the panel or any member or
segment thereof; however, in the interest of due consideration being given to
such proceedings and in the interest of encouraging consideration of claims
informally and without the necessity of litigation, the applicable statute of
limitations shall be tolled and not deemed to run during the time that such a
claim is pending before such a panel and for thirty (30) days thereafter.
See Idaho Code § 6-1005.

P .2d at 10 1 (emphasin original)(internal quotation marks omitted). The Golay Court did not
correct Schraufnagel's statements regarding the intersection between legal mistake and
excusable neglect.
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In turn, Idaho Code § 6-1006 provides as follows:
During said thirty (30) day period neither party shall commence or prosecute
litigation involving the issues submitted to the panel and the distric/ or other
courts havingjurisdiction olany pending such claims shed! stay proceedings
in the interest of the conduct o.lsuch proceedings before the panel.

See, Idaho Code § 6-1006 (emphasis added). In Moss, supra, this Court held that, where a plainti ff
commences a lawsuit prior to commencing prelitigation proceedings, lithe district court is vested
with authority to stay civil proceedings until the prelitigation screening panel renders its advisory
opinion. Jd., 115 Idaho at 167, 765 P .2d at 678. The Court noted that" [a] contrary deci sion wou ld
II

not only render I.e. § 6-1006 superfluous, but would also contravene the settled proposition that,
whenever possible, cases should be decided on the merits." Jd. Notably, nowhere in the Moss
decision did the Court state that the plaintiff had requested a stay. !d.

Rudd, supra, appears to represent a departure from Moss. In Rudd, the

COUl1

noted that

"[a]lthough [Idaho Code § 6-1006] authorizes the trial court to stay civil proceedings until the
prelitigation screening panel renders its opinion ... the Plaintiffs in the instant case did not seek any

such stay." Id., 138 Idaho at 531,66 P.3d at 235 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court held
that although § 6-1006 provides that district courts "shall" stay court proceedings in deference to
prelitigation proceedings, a party must request such a stay. Critically, the Court declined to deCide
"whether a stay issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1006 would justify failing to serve the summons
and complaint while that stay was in effect." Id. In its opinion, the Court noted yet again that "the
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Plaintiffs did not seek any such stay from the district court." Id. at 138 Idaho at 533, 66 P.3d at 237.
Likewise, in Elliott, supra, although the Court said that it has "never held that service of process
cannot be accomplished while a matter is pending before the prelitigation screening paneL" Ie!
Idaho at 289, 271 P.3d at

6~7,

15~

that case similarly did not concern a request for a stay.

Rudd and Elliott do not address the issues before the Court. Neither Rudd nor any other
decision, statute, or rule impose a deadline for seeking a stay, and no authority prohibits a stay nunc

pro tunc. And it is still an open question whether a stay pursuant to § 6-1006 would toll Rule
4(a)(2)'s service deadline.
Critically, because there is no statutory or case law-imposed deadline for requesting a stay,
whether the District Court erred by declining to stay the case nunc pro tunc is not a question of good
cause or excusable neglect. Pure and simple, it is a question of what the prelitigation statutes, with
their stated intent, required the District Court to do, or, alternatively, what the District Court. in its
discretion. should have done. Given that the District Court appears to ha\c misconstrucd the Ic!:':li
boundaries of its discretion,'4 the standards are one and the same: whether the District Court
committed error. See, Highland Enter., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009
(1999) (noting that elements of abuse of discretion analysis include "whether the court correctly

14As noted above, the District Court defined the issue as whether Taylor sought to "shift
the good cause inquiry of Rule 4(a)(2) into a less stringent excusable neglect inquiry simply by
filing a motion to stay nunc pro tunc after the six-month requirement has passed and EIRMC has
filed a motion to dismiss." R. Vol. I, p. 140. But whether to stay the case nunc pro tunc is not a
Rule 6(b) question or even a Rule 4(a)(2) question, but a question of the proper interpretation of
§6-1006.
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perceived that the issue was one of discretion," and "whether the court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable

to

the specific

choices available to it"). This Court must therefore decide two issues offirst impression: (1) should
the timing of a request to stay a case pursuant to § 6-1006 matter; and (2) does a stay pursuant to §
6-1006 also toll Rule 4(a)(2)'s service deadline? The answers are no and yes, respectively.

1.

The Timing of a Request to Stay a Case Pursuant to § 6-1006 Should Be Irrelevant.

Nowhere does § 6-1006, or any of the case law interpreting it, including Rudd, provide a
deadline for seeking a stay. Moreover, § 6-1006, as interpreted by Moss, makes the granting of such
a stay an unconditional requirement. See, Idaho Code § 6-1006 ("[T]he district or other courts
having jurisdiction of any pending such claims shall stay proceedings in the interest of the conduct
of such proceedings before the panel." (emphasis added». There appears to be no dispute that, had
Taylor requested a stay at the outset of litigation, the District Court would have been required to
grant that request.
There also appears to be no dispute that no Idaho statute or reported appellate decision
establishes a deadline by which a party must request a stay. Given that a plaintiff may first file a
lawsuit before commencing prelitigation proceedings, must the plaintiff request the stay
immediately? Within two months? Within the six-month window described

111

Rule 4(a)(2),!

Within some time prior to whatever date upon which the prelitigation panel issues its
recommendation? Does the analysis change if the case is substantially litigated simultaneous with
pre litigation proceedings? If a party relies upon some action or inaction of another party? If nothing
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happens in the litigation at all? Idaho law is silent on this issue. All this Court can do IS apply tbe
plain language of the pertinent statutes, consistent with - again

Idaho's established policy of

permitting litigation to be decided on its merits, as well as the stated legislative intent of the
prelitigation procedure. See, Doe v. Boy Scouts olAm., 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.2d 494.497
(2009) ("[SJtatutory interpretation begins with the literal words ofa statute, which are the best guide
to determining legislative intent. "); Action Collection Serv., Inc. v. Haught, 146 Idaho 300, 303-04,
193 P.3d 460,463-64 (Ct. App. 2008) (liThe plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly

expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd results."
(emphasis added)).
The Idaho Legislature appears to have removed discretion - for instance, the abilIty to
discern differences in the variables described above - from courts regarding stays. Idaho Code

~

6-1006 requires a stay. See, Idaho Code § 6-1006 ("[TJhe district or other courts havi ngj urisdict lOll
of any pending such claims shall stay proceedings in the interest of the conduct of such proceed i ngs
before the panel." (emphasis added)). Given that that is the only guidance the statute affords, a
district court must evidently stay the case whenever there are pre litigation proceedings (and,
according to Rudd, whenever a stay is requested).

It follows that if a district court must grant a stay whenever one is requested, and no statute
or decision places a time restriction on such a request, so long as no party is prej udiced thereby, a
district should be able to impose a stay of litigation at any time, even nunc pro tunc. Rule 4(a)(2)
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should not impact that rule. 15 Such a rule is consistent with Idaho's established goal of resolving
cases on their merits, rather than on the highly technical basis of whether a stay was requested.
Indeed, the Court has already construed § 6-1006 in a way that fosters Idaho's substantive-resolution
policy. See, Moss, 115 Idaho at 167,765 P.2d at 678.
In the district court, EIRMC and Dr. Chamberlain argued. and the District Court concluded
(all without citation to any authority) that a party should not be able to circumvent a motion to
dismiss simply by making a request for relief nunc pro tunc. But why? If the stay must be granted
anyway, regardless of its timing, and no party is any worse off than they would have been had the
stay been requested earlier, such a rule would serve no purpose. In fact, it flies in the face ofIdaho's
commitment to resolve cases on their merits rather than on procedural technicalities. And. at its
extreme application, it would permit parties to simultaneously litigate and participate in pre litigation
proceedings - an outcome that appears manifestly contrary to the stated intent behind the
prelitigation proceeding statutes. If the legislative intent is for prelitigation proceedings to not occur
simultaneolls with litigation, and that is actually how it plays out in a particular case even though
a stay was never formally requested, what justice is done by dismissing a casejust because the stay
is not requested until later?

Suppose, for example, a situation where a plaintiff substantially litigates a case but then requests a
stay within six months. The purpose of prelitigation proceedings would be thwarted, Rule 4(a)(2)
would simply serve as an "out"-a procedural maneuver-to a plaintiff that wants to stall litigation
that is going poorly for it. That should not be the rule. The better rule of timing is a prejudice
analysis. Moreover, on its face, Rule 4(a)(2) does not speak to when a stay must be requested; only
when service must be completed. Again, where a plaintiff responds to a motion to dismiss based
on a failure to serve by seeking a stay nunc pro tunc, imposing such a stay would not be some fair
procedural exception that obliterates a rule. Rather, it would foster a decision on the merits. and is
nothing more than a procedural defense to a procedural attack.
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Here, none of the Respondents occupied a different position than they would have had had
Taylor requested a stay at the outset. Indeed, no litigation in the district court occurred at all. As
none of the Respondents suffered any prejudice, and because the District Court would have been
obligated to grant such a request anyway, the District Court erred by not imposing a stay nunc pro

tunc, such that service upon Respondents would have been timely.
2.

A Stay Pursuant to § 6-1006 Tolls Rule 4(a)(2),s Service Deadline.

The stated purpose of prelitigation screening proceedings is to promote nonjudicial
settlement. See, Idaho Code § 6-1001 (legislative history) (noting that it IS "in the public Interest
to encourage nonlitigation resolution of claims against physicians and hospitals by providing for
prelitigation screening of such claims by a hearing panel as provided in this act"); see also S.L.
1976, ch. 278, § 1. Similarly, § 6-1005 tolls the statute of limitations "in the interest of due
consideration being given to such proceedings and in the interest of encouraging consideration of
claims informally and without the necessity of litigation." See, Idaho Code 6-1005. Everything
about the prelitigation procedure points to a purpose of fostering settlement, and § 6-1006 should
be construed consistent with that purpose.
During the thirty-day period following the conclusion of pre litigation proceedings, "neither
party shall commence or prosecute litigation involving the issues submitted to the paneL" See, Idaho
Code § 6-1 006 (emphasis added), That language informs the scope of the stay, If a plainti ffcannot
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even commence a lawsuit, it plainly cannot move it forward by serving opposing parties with
process. And not tolling the service deadline would undermine the very purpose of prel itigation
proceedings, which is to reach, if possible, a nonjudicial resolution to medical malpractice claims.
and requiring prelitigation proceedings to take precedence over litigation to achieve that end.
Although the Rudd Court left open the issue of whether a stay pursuant to

~

6-1006 would toll the

service deadline, it appears rather obvious that it would.

D.

Taylor is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal.

Taylor is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate
Rules 40 and 41. Idaho Code § 12-121 and l.A.R. 41 allow for the award of attorney's fees and costs
in a civil action where a matter was defended frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.
I.A.R. 40 allows for the award of costs to the prevailing party on appeal.
In this matter, the District Court clearly erred by failing to allow Taylor's case to be decided
on the merits, and violated a discretionary, nonmandatory, nonjurisdictional procedural rule. The
District Court further erred in failing to apply Rule 6(b). granting dismissal of Taylor's complaint
where the other parties suffered no prejudice. and denyi ng Taylor's request for a stay 171117(' pm tllne.
For these reasons, Taylor is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

v.

CONCLUSION

Rules exist for a purpose, and have meaning, but they should not be so slavishly adhered to
that they block real justice. Idaho decidedly favors the resolution of cases on their merits

not at

any and all costs, but certainly where the alleged error is a violation of a discretionary,
nonmandatory, nonjurisdictional procedural rule, and where the other parties suffer no prejudice as
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a result. The District Court therefore erred by failing to apply Rule 6(b). At a minimum. this Court
should therefore remand this case to the District Court for a determination of excusable neglect
consistent with the principles articulated herein. More properly, however, it should simply reverse
the District Court's dismissal of Taylor's claims against Respondents without prejudice, on the
ground that any delay on Taylor's part was justified by excusable neglect. Alternatively, this Court
should reverse the District Court's denial of Taylor's request for a stay nunc pro tunc.
DATED this

1- day of August, 2012.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
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